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REPLY ARGUMENT 
The issues I raised on appeal involve laws and procedures that 
are wholly repugnant to the institution of marriage. These obvious 
flaws have gone unchallenged for so long because the Courts' 
procedures completely disrupt marriages that could be preserved in 
the judicial system. 
Many articles and publications by the Bar and Bench are 
concerned with the lack of respect lawyers receive compared to other 
professions, particularly doctors. It is of some value to compare 
divorce law to the medical field to uncover the real problems. It 
is hard to imagine a dentist being instructed to heal a cavity like 
a flesh wound "except as provided in this chapter" especially if he 
ignores all the exceptions and treats it like a wound. [See Utah 
Code 30-3-1(1)]. He wouldn't save any teeth and would likely do 
more damage than if he had done nothing. 
Divorce and marriage problems have very little to do with 
neighbors who are disputing a fence line. Litigation and' 
accusatory proceedings may work in resolving fence lines, because 
the parties are not united for life, but trials cannot solve 
marriage problems. This is the reason the trial judge decrees 
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divorce nearly 100% of the time instead of sometimes dismissing the 
complaint. 
If a doctor uses an operating procedure that ends in failure 
and the patient's death 100% of the time, the public would be irate 
if he didn't cease that procedure. Why should the public admire a 
justice system that never heals marriages, as directed by the 
legislature, and causes more disruption of the relationship and 
high costs in the process? And children end up as the real silent 
victims who pay the rest of their lives. 
The Salt Lake Tribune's front page reported recently (June 3, 
1997) in an article entitled "For Children, Time May Not Heal the 
Wounds of Divorce": 
"The child's suffering does not reach its 
peak at the time of breakoff and then level 
off," she says (Judith Wallerstein) "On the 
contrary, divorce is a cumulative experience 
for the child. Its impact increases over 
time". (Emphasis added). 
Counsel points out (C.4), the strained relationships of me and 
the children, but the trial court has simply sought to sever 
entirely those relationships instead of correcting how others have 
interfered. Page 62 of "The Abolition of Marriage" (See Addendum) 
says: 
"But when the father moves out of the 
home, the paternal relationship deteriorates 
rapidly...More than half of the children whose 
fathers don't live with them say they don't 
get all of the affection they need from their 
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fathers. Again, those who saw their absent 
fathers frequently did not evaluate their 
relationships more favorably than those who 
saw them infrequently." 
(Page 60) "To a considerable and unrecognized extent, 
the father's role is sustained through and by 
women. When women (many for very understand-
able reasons) refuse to take on this burden, 
the child suffers the loss as well." 
(Page 61) "Here is the puzzle the current research 
poses: Although inside of marriage the 
presence of an active father makes a great 
difference in the children's well being, the 
presence of that same father outside of 
marriage, seems not to have the same benefits 
for children. 
The father's role is particularly fragile 
and vulnerable to disruption outside of the 
marriage." 
For some reason counsel says my memorandum to the trial court was 
"untimely" (C.5), while admitting that it was delivered to the court 
before trial on September 6, 1996 and after August 22, 1996 (The 
date of the Court's minute entry and denial). It could not have 
been more timely. 
The "Statement of Facts" of counsel's brief needs several 
corrections. (C.6-C.7) It says that there have been "real problems" 
but ignores the efforts that have led to real solutions. 
Marriage vows are made to commit a couple to surmount problems. 
The marriage covenant is not dependant on a lack of "problems and 
difficulties," for they come to every marriage. For example, 
counsel says that our problems started when I lost my job. He then 
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complains in the next paragraph that for a couple of months I 
failed to support my family, but ignores that the direct result of 
my willingness to look for a new job (R.4 07) during those months, 
that I got a new supervisor and position that has led to a couple 
of promotions and several raises. (R.445). If I had not left my 
job in search of better employment I would have continued the 
problem of the same position and low pay. But I returned to a new 
position that has allowed me to double my income in only two years 
and receive full benefits for medical, dental, retirement and 
vacation, etc. which we lacked before. Leaving the family for that 
time was not the problem or grounds for divorce, but rather the 
solution to the problem (R. 359,407,472) . 
Several times in error, counsel says (C.6,7) that I separated 
myself from the family. It is well established in the record 
(R.356,357) that my wife and I have not lived together since she 
took the children and left. She admitted that she stayed in 3 
different homes, she kept the children from me and she was "afraid 
to come home" before I left. She refused to return home until I 
left, I didn't want to leave (R.493) and the marriage counselor 
asked me (R.358) to do it so he could work with Piper. (R.393,381, 
472,473) 
Counsel errors again by saying that the family was "without 
financial resources or support" during that time, when, in fact, 
the home was paid for so there was no mortgage payment, there was 
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plenty of food and I paid the bills ahead (R.437,438). Counsel 
wrongly says there was no money when, in fact, Piper had $1,000.00 
in her own insurance investments that she didn't use until months 
after filing for divorce (R.311). 
Counsel says (C.7) the Trial Court granted the divorce on the 
grounds of a long list of faults that he lists, when, in fact, the 
Trial Court said simply that divorce was granted on my wife's 
testimony that "the differences are irreconcilable" (R.505). The 
Court did not mention: "controlling, critical of her and the 
children, very domineering, preaching to her which made her feel 
degraded and unworthy," much less say they were grounds as counsel 
asserts. In the same paragraph counsel infers my agreement with my 
wife's conclusions, when my testimony clearly shows those listed 
faults belong to the people who told Piper to get a divorce (R.159, 
162,163,168,459). 
Counsel then claims I blame "unnamed others" who, in fact, are 
named by himself on page 458 of the record. I simply followed the 
advice of the Utah Supreme Court to avoid printing more than is 
necessary that could embarrass others in public records. (Cawley v. 
Cawley 202 P. 10,11): 
"If we undertook to state the evidence we 
would be compelled to publish many things that 
would be of no benefit to either bench or bar 
and could subserve no good purpose whatever. 
To publish the evidence in this case and make 
it a permanent record in our official reports 
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could only result in doing an unnecessary 
thing and one which, in after years, might 
easily become a constant source of regret to 
both parties and their friends, while 
benefiting no one." 
Last of all (C.7) counsel has the nerve to pursue a claim that 
I refused to go to marriage counseling. His claim amounts to no 
more than his scheme of telling my wife to call me a couple of days 
before trial and offer to attend conciliation if I gave up my 
interest in our home at trial (R.408,409) . When the truth began to 
come to light at trial, counsel attempted to cover it up by saying 
(R.372) "Objection. It's in the course of trying to compromise and 
settle the case, and it's not admissible." It is not true to say 
I refused to attend marriage counseling. 
ISSUE "A" 
With grounds in dispute/ did the Trial Court err by placing my 
wife and I in adversarial roles? 
and 
With grounds in dispute, did the Trial Court err by failing to 
provide opportunity through the Court to reconcile before trial by, 
but not limited to, conciliation? 
Contrary to counsel's brief (C.9), Utah Code 30-3-17 is not 
dependant on "assuming the District Court had established a Family 
Court." It is entirely apart from the "Family Court". Its own 
language begins, "The judge of a District Court may counsel either 
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spouse or both...." and then gives him the option of sending this 
couple before "a domestic relations counselor" if available or many 
other persons as he sees fit. The fact there are no "domestic 
relation counselors" (C.8,9) only narrows the District Court 
judge's options by one. 
This issue applies instead to Utah Code 30-3-12 that says, 
"Each District Court.... shall exercise the family counseling powers 
conferred by this act." (Emphasis added) Those powers are found 
in Utah Code 30-3-17 and other places. Clearly "shall" is not 
discretionary for A. E. v. Christean 316 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (May 
2, 1997) says it could only be discretionary if it were not "for 
the benefit of the parent and/or child." 
The legislature demands that the courts do something to try to 
preserve all families. This follows the logic that if the 
legislature expresses the State's interest in retaining power over 
marriage to preserve it, that the courts must reflect that interest 
by making reconciliation efforts when we come before the court. If 
the legislature wanted to be "divorce Dispensers" instead of 
marriage preservers, they could just have us pay an extra ten 
dollars for divorce at the same time we register our automobiles, 
but their compelling interest is to save families! Quoting again 
the recent decision in A. E. v. Christean, The Utah Court of 
Appeals says on Page 6: 
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. . . ."Strive to act in the best interest of the 
minor's in all cases and attempt to preserve 
and strengthen family ties where possible.".... 
"Every reasonable effort should be made to 
preserve the family unit." (Emphasis added) 
The statutes that are quoted in both briefs show this 
unmistakable legislative intent to preserve marriage. Counsel errs 
by saying (C.1,2) that the standard of review is an abuse of 
discretion standard. The legal issue is more properly under a 
correction of error standard. The Utah Supreme Court ruled this 
year, Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asay 932 P. 2d 592 (Utah 1997) on page 
593: 
"The interpretation of statutes poses a 
question of law, which this Court reviews for 
correctness and without deference to the lower 
court's conclusions ..." 
"This Court has not previously had 
occasion to interpret Section 30-28-5(1) of 
the act. We therefore "note the directive that 
we construe statutes liberally with a view to 
effect [ing] their objects and to promot[ing] 
justice. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2. Upon a 
question of first impression such as this, it 
is our duty to accord that section effect." 
(Emphasis added) 
Repeatedly, before trial, The District Court grossly exceeds 
the power and jurisdiction accorded by the legislature and 
continually fails its responsibilities and obligations demanded by 
law. 
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Anonymous Wife v. Anonymous Husband 739 P. 2d 791 (Ariz.App. 
1986) page 793 clearly explains; 
"This country did not inherit either a 
common law or a statutory law of divorce, 
because divorce was in the realm of the 
English ecclesiastical courts until the 19th 
century and canon law was controlling..." 
"Since our courts were without inherent 
legal or equitable powers relating to divorce, 
the guiding principle is that every power 
exercised by a court in a divorce proceeding 
must find its source in the relevant statutory 
framework, "or it does not exist" • . . . 
"It follows that in a divorce proceeding 
the trial court can consider only strictly 
germane matters." (Emphasis added) 
Even the Utah Court of Appeals explains in Haumont v. Haumont 
793 P. 2d 421,427 (Utah App. 1990): 
"Where a form of conduct referred to in a 
statute designates the persons and things to 
which it refers, "there is an inference that 
all omissions should be understood as 
exclusions." (Emphasis added) 
Here are a few examples of the District Court's errors. After 
receiving the complaint for divorce and the reply, why did the 
District Court not try to effect reconciliation? (Utah Code 3 0-3-
11.1, 30-3-12, 30-3-16.1-16.7, 30-3-17) Why did the District Court 
not talk with us and explain the State's compelling interest in 
resolving our disputes and saving the marriage? Instead, the 
District Court allowed and encouraged claims and counterclaims and 
then issues an Order on Order to Show Cause (R.71-77) on a long 
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list of items. The legislature did not encourage or authorize all 
this governmental and legal intrusion and activity over all these 
issues. It only allows for alimony, child support [Utah Code 30-3-
3(3)], custody [30-3-10(1)], visitation [30-3-34(1)] and "interim 
orders as may be just and equitable" [30-3-18(1)]. Why does the 
District Court make me surrender all property rights or fight my 
wife for it? It certainly wasn't the legislature's intention. Why 
am I restrained from seeing my wife and using any of our property? 
The District Court should not have considered all these issues, but 
it had the duty to be equitable anyway. How do I reconcile with my 
wife when ordered to stay away until trial? The District Court 
should have reunited us instead. The law tells the judge to give 
orders to save the marriage and to "compel" "other persons" (Utah 
Code 30-3-16.1, 30-3-17). "Other persons" should have been 
restrained, not me. 
I sought reconciliation, but the District Court threatened me 
if I didn't start fighting against my wife for divorce. On March 
28, 1996, the District Court sent me a letter that says in part 
(R.105): 
"Failure to file the financial declaration 
and proposed settlement forms may result in 
the pre-trial settlement conference being 
continued, attorney fees assessed and other 
sanctions imposed against one or both parties." 
The District Court further threatens (R.115): 
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"FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE, 
PRESENT AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL 
AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF 
THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR ITS DECISION". 
Nowhere in Title 30, does the legislature authorize the 
District Court to show such defiance and contempt for our property 
and privacy rights. The Statutes repeatedly use the word 
"equitable", which means fair. That is the District Court's duty. 
It is no wonder that clear, blatant acts and threats like this 
cause the parties to give up on the marriage and children and to 
begin fighting for the best situation in divorce. 
ISSUE "B" 
Did the Trial Court err in granting divorce without showing 
the irreparable breakdown of the marriage? 
Counsel says this issue should be reviewed under the "clearly 
erroneous standard" (C.2,C10). He is wrong, as the Trial Court 
has no discretion to decree divorce. Correction of error standard 
is required in this Question of law. (See page 8 of reply brief, 
Zoll and Branch) Utah Code 30-3-4(1) (b) and (d)(P.2) requires 
divorce decrees to be based on the evidence. 
Counsel further errs (C.12) by saying that I haven't 
marshalled the evidence, while he tries to introduce as "evidence" 
what the trial judge excluded. It is a a fact that the trial judge 
said before trial that Piper could have a divorce if she wanted 
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it. (R.166) That "conclusion of law" the trial judge affirmed in the 
ruling by saying (R.505): 
"She is not willing to enter into marriage 
counseling at this point and not willing to 
remain married at this point. The plaintiff, 
I believe, also based upon her testimony, has 
concluded that she does not wish to have a 
reconciliation." (Emphasis added) 
The trial judge then proceeded to say that the divorce decree 
is being based upon the wife's conclusions, in spite of the law 
that demands divorce to based on the evidence. Counsel says 
himself(C.12) : 
"The Court found that the plaintiff had 
concluded that their differences are so great 
that no reasonable effort would reconcile 
them." (Emphasis added) 
The Court never found "irreconcilable differences". 
Counsel tries to present as "evidence" what the trial judge did 
not sanction. For example, he says that I disapproved of Piper 
working out of the home. At trial he tried to get her to say that 
I disapproved before she filed for divorce (R.301),but she couldn't 
because it is a subject we have never discussed, so he claimed a 
letter written January 19, 1996 says this (R.469), but the judge 
excluded such evidence in the ruling by saying (R.504): "that 
testimony was limited to the past year and preceding the filing of 
the complaint." 
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Everyone must remember that the record shows that the trial 
judge permitted a continuing objection on all the testimony the 
Court was allowing (R.2 98). Although the legislature's expressed 
desire for a "no-fault" ground was to prevent inflammatory 
accusations at trial, the trial judge, instead, allowed all 
testimony on any fault, weakness, mistake or event in my life in a 
"witch-hunt" for grounds (R.297,298). Now counsel endeavors to use 
a full page (C.ll) of immaterial, moot or negated past events as 
proof of "irreconcilable differences", but the trial judge said 
"past year" (R.504) not "during the marriage (C.ll)." 
Proper evidence must support the true meaning of 
"irreconcilable differences of the marriage" [Utah Code 30-3-
1(3)(h)]. According to the dictionary it means: differences that 
are impossible to reconcile. For example, my car mechanic may find 
my car difficult to fix and may not want to fix it. He may list a 
lot of problems and we may even disagree, but none of this means 
that the car is impossible to fix. 
The Utah Supreme Court (Zoll v. Branch, P.C. v. Asay 932 P2.d 
592,594) says: 
".... Statutes are generally to be 
construed according to their plain language. 
When language is clear and unambiguous, 
it must be held to mean what it expresses and 
no room is left for construction." 
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Counsel gives no admissible, authentic, corroborated evidence 
at all of differences or why they are impossible to reconcile. For 
authority he uses Grosskopf v. Grosskopf 672 P. 2d 814 (Wyl984), but 
look at the substantial differences that the Court found as facts 
and evidence in that case (Page 818): 
". . .. Insistent that the parties move.... 
wanted appellee to quit his job 
. . . .dissatisfied with the home and wanted to 
sell it....decided to practice celibacy during 
the last two years ...."etc, etc. 
And most of all the Court found (P.817): 
The evidence established, and the parties 
generally agreed that the differences existing 
between them were such that there was no 
prospect for reconciling." (Emphasis added) 
If this Appellate Court feels that the language of the statute 
is unclear and subject to arbitrary, inconsistent enforcement, then 
the decisions of many States show a proper understanding of "no-
fault" divorce in 55 ALR 3d 581 (R. 173-209, see addendum) as argued 
in the appellant's brief (P.20-29) , as does 24 AmJur 2d § 31 that 
lists many cases that show "irreconcilable differences" refering to 
"substantial" impairment of the marital relationship, that "mere 
unhappiness" or "parties" cannot decide if grounds exist and that 
the court must find, not "perfunctorily", differences with no 
"possibility of elimination, correction or resolution." 
I correctly marshall this evidence. Almost all the trial 
judge says to base the ruling is quoted in my brief (P.20,21) and 
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then I quote from the record substantially all the evidence used by 
the judge (P.22) . I then demonstrate that not only are the 
"findings legally insufficient" (C.10,12), but are completely non-
existent within the meaning of the law. The District Court cannot 
say, "I find grounds because the wife concludes that there are 
irreconcilable differences." 
ISSUE "C" 
Is Utah Code 30-3-1(3)(h) "irreconcilable differences of the 
marriage" unconstitutional? 
This issue is properly before the Appellate Court, being 
timely raised to the Trial Court and in the pleadings. [In James v. 
Preston 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) the Court of Appeals 
says: "A matter is sufficiently raised if it has been submitted to 
the Trial Court and the Trial Court has had the opportunity to make 
findings of fact or law."] 
My exact words to the Court were (R.166) : 
"55 ALR 3d 581 is probably the best source 
to show how a "no-fault" divorce can be 
appealed from numerous diverse legal aspects 
if not shown to be a marriage that "had 
irreparably broken down." A divorce cannot be 
decreed without "substantial reasons". ... 
"After all, the original Utah Constitution 
down to this day says in Article I, Sec. 7 
[due process of law] No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law". 
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The above ALR annotation, with its discussion on 
constitutionality, was given in its entirety to the trial judge and 
is included in the record(R.173-209). After a lengthy discussion 
and debate in trial about the meaning and use of this no-fault law, 
the trial judge allowed a continuing objection (R.2 98) to avoid a 
long stream of objections. I believe the question of 
constitutionality is a part of that objection, as much so as is the 
irrelevant and immaterial evidence received by the Trial Court. 
(Some things discussed happened near the beginning of the 
marriage). 
Furthermore, the trial judge refused repeatedly to allow time 
for us to present all our evidence (P.34)(R.476). The effort was 
made, in vain, many times at trial to have the judge consider this 
authority (R.288,490,492,500). Counsel quotes this ALR authority 
(R.175). He says of irreconcilable differences (C.13): 
"....and unconstitutional vagueness of 
statutory language, but no dissolution of 
marriage act of the type here under 
consideration has been held invalid as of this 
writing." 
•Counsel says, (C.13) "statutes providing for dissolution of 
marriage on grounds of irreconcilable differences, have been held 
to be valid". And repeats the same sentence almost verbatim on 
page 15 of his brief. 
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But the question here is not whether any "no-fault" statute is 
constitutional, the question is; Is Utah Code 30-3-1(3) (h) 
"irreconcilable differences of the marriage" unconstitutional? 
No doubt other States have succeeded drafting valid laws, but 
Utah's legislature did not do its job completely to make Utah's law 
sound. 
It is not lightly that the validity of this law is being 
raised. This question is as serious as any issue in this brief, 
maybe more so. 
The Utah Supreme Court says (Rio Grande v. Darke 167 
P.241,242): 
"The citizens of a free government are 
justly jealous of their constitutional rights 
and privileges, and this should be attributed 
to them as a virtue rather than a fault. It 
keeps them on the alert and inspires them with 
courage and determination in their efforts to 
resist the aggressions of arbitrary power. It 
is just as obligatory upon the citizen to 
resist encroachments upon his rights and 
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution as it 
is for him to uphold and maintain its 
integrity." (Emphasis added) 
And further (Garfield Smelting Co. V. Industrial Commission of 
Utah 178 P. 57,62): 
"If there is one fundamental principle 
which is calculated to perpetuate our form of 
government, both federal and state, more than 
any other it is that every citizen, regardless 
of his station or condition, is entitled to 
the equal protection of the law whether it 
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applies to his personal or to his property 
rights. Every law which offends against that 
principle in the federal Constitution is 
necessarily invalid". 
Herein on page 16 is counsel's quote which includes the words 
"unconstitutional vagueness of the statutory language." 
The Utah Supreme Court explains vagueness in State v. Hoffman 
733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987): 
"'Vagueness' goes to the issue of 
procedural due process, i.e., whether the 
statute is sufficiently explicit and clear to 
inform the ordinary reader of common 
intelligence what conduct is prohibited." 
(Emphasis added) 
Piper and I got married in 1978 when "fault grounds" told us 
what behavior, in clear language, could end our marriage. In 1987 
the legislature added a no-fault ground with no explanation as to 
its meaning or use. (It was like putting a baby elephant into a 
henhouse with no special accommodation for its different nature). 
Now what did the statute tell me to do to prevent divorce? It 
was not explicit and clear to me or to anyone else in the court 
room. The trial judge repeatedly advocated that it means that 
anyone who asks for a divorce and doesn't want to work on the 
marriage can have one (R.166,504,505) . This means that marriage is 
not a vow or lifetime commitment, but merely the same thing as what 
used to be its polar opposite. To the trial judge marriage is 
"shacking up." However those who just "live together" can split up 
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and make every decision to divide and pay everything without going 
to the courthouse. This is a denial of equal protection which will 
be discussed later. 
"Irreconcilable differences" was argued in another extreme by 
counsel. At trial, counsel maintained that this statute was just 
another fault ground which allowed any and all faults to be 
presented. No longer was evidence or testimony limited to a 
specific area; anything was allowed now. Counsel said (R. 2 97) : 
Utah is still a fault State and 
irreconcilable differences is one of the 
grounds set forth in the statute as the basis 
for divorce, and that is fault." (Emphasis 
added) 
The Utah Supreme Court gives a three-step test for vagueness 
that this statute fails entirely. The Court then says: (State v. 
Packard 250 P. 2d 561,564) "However, whichever way it was meant, 
uncertainties would exist which make the statute void." (Emphasis 
added) 
Having studied the issue in depth, my argument of its meaning 
differed greatly from the Trial Court and counsel and revolved 
around the oft-mentioned 55 ALR 3d 581. 
Furthermore, this legal authority that I provided to support 
this claim also speaks about being "overbroad" (R.181) on the pages 
that I named (P. 29) for the benefit of this Court. Because the 
trial judge based the ruling and divorce decree on: (R.504) "He 
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preaches to her" and "she's disagreed" and "the parties have 
disagreed," then this statute is also fatally overbroad for it 
forbids us our fundamental right to freedom of speech. 
(Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section I; United States 
Constitution, Amendment I) The dictionary says of "preach": to urge 
acceptance or abandonment of an idea or course of action, to 
advocate earnestly; and says to "disagree" means to differ in 
opinion. It makes no sense to dissolve a marriage simply because 
someone exercised their constitutional right to communicate their 
opinions. To refuse a spouse this right of freedom of speech would 
mean having to "agree" to everything and anything one's mate says 
or does. That sounds like slavery, not marriage. 
The Utah Supreme Court (In re Boyer 636 P. 2d 1085, 1090) 
quotes the United States Supreme Court as follows: 
"A clear and precise enactment may 
nevertheless be 'overbroad' if in its reach it 
prohibits constitutionally protected conduct." 
It is plain error for the trial judge to decree divorce based 
on "preaching" and "disagreeing" for those fall under our fundamental 
S^ght of freedom of speech. Also the judgment must fail because it 
was plain error for the trial judge to deprive me of virtually all 
our property and my relationships with our children. 
In State v. Dunn 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court explains the three requirements to obtain appellate 
relief from error even if it were "not properly objected to." These 
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are similar to those enumerated by the United States Supreme Court 
in May of this year [Johnson v. U. S. 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1546, 
(1997)]. Moreover, J". I. Case Credit Corp. v. Foos 717 P.2d 1064, 
1066 (Kan. App. 1986) provides unlimited appellate review on 
conclusions of law on unraised issues when plain error is evident 
or fundamental rights are at issue. [See also Falk v. Keene Corp. 
782 P.2d 974, 982 (Wash. 1989)]. 
Instead of following the law and preserving our family as 
desired by the legislature, the trial judge was very anxious to use 
power and authority in all other areas of our lives. In the 
process, the judge awarded to me the use of less than 2% of our 
entire estate, awarded my wife alimony although she had no house 
payment, gave me nearly all the marital debt to pay and restrained 
the children from going with me or staying with me. This is 
obvious and plain error that impedes my constitutional right to our 
property and to be with our children. "Irreconcilable differences" 
evaporated my most cherished rights when I joined a small class of 
citizens who dared to seek to oppose the dissolution of marriage 
(R.180). It permitted procedures that allowed the government to 
intrude in areas with no reason to be there. 
On May 1, 1996, a minute entry to the District Court says; 
"Commissioner recommends: set for trial on the following issues," 
followed by a list of nine items (R.104) . No where in Title 30 
does the legislature tell the judge to make orders about our life 
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insurance, or retirement or our property, but it seems after so 
many years of unchallenged power, that the judiciary began to 
exceed its authority. Missing from the list is grounds! The 
commissioner told us, in effect, that "irreconcilable differences" 
meant the marriage was over when my wife asked for a divorce 
(R.165). 
Utah Code 3 0-3-5(1) says: 
"When a decree of divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or 
obligations, and parties." (Emphasis added) 
It is plain error for the Court to order me to receive 1% of 
our property for the next decade. It had no authority to impair 
this constitutional right and any order it made should have made 
sure we each immediately received 50% of the property. The judgment 
also fails for depriving me of the right of maintaining parental 
ties with our children. [A. E. v. Christean 316 Utah Adv. Rep 3,4 
(May 1, 1997) , In re J.P. Utah, 648 P.2d 1364, 1372-1374] 
The Utah Supreme Court says in Bountiful City v. De Luca 292 
P. 194,199 that the police powers of the State cannot "Infringe or 
invade" constitutional rights and on page 2 01 that our "right to 
^property" is protected from "impairment or abridgement." Nearly 
every page of Block v. Schwartz 76 P. 22 has directives by the Utah 
Supreme Court warning against the State using its police power to 
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overstep rights to a "class" or individual which are accorded to 
"other persons". 
It is plain error for the judge to say before trial that my 
wife can have a divorce if she wants it(R.166). "Irreconcilable 
difference" caused the trial judge to deny a fair trial and to 
improperly receive evidence of fault. The United States Supreme 
Court says [Bracy v. Gramley 1175 S.Ct. 1793, 1797, (1997)]: 
"But the floor established by the Due 
Process Clause clearly requires a 'fair trial 
in a fair tribunal, ... ' before a judge with 
no actual bias against the defendant or 
interest in the outcome of his particular 
case." (Emphasis added) 
The validity of the statute is further eroded by the United 
States Supreme Court in Gilbert v. Homar 117 S.Ct. 1807, 1812 
(1997) when it explains a part of due process includes "the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of such [private] interest through the 
procedures used." 
The judgment perishes from failure to follow the Utah Supreme 
Court's direction concerning fundamental rights (H-L-v. Matheson 
604 P. 2d 907, 909): 
"Legislative enactments must be narrowly 
drawn to express only the legitimate State 
interests at stake." 
See also Rupp v. Grantsville City 610 P. 2d 338,341 [6] . 
Finally, 16A AmJur 2d § 771 explains the United States Supreme 
Court ruling (Eisenstadt v. Baird) of a State statute : 
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"Providing dissimilar treatment for 
married and unmarried persons who are 
similarly situated, the statute violates the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Utah Code 30-3-1(3) (h) is unconstitutional as vague and 
overbroad which confusion was the cause of a judgment that denied 
due process, equal protection and allowed government intrusion into 
fundamental rights. It is the root cause of much plain error that 
should nullify the judgment and decree. The law cannot burden us 
and deprive us rights that all other people enjoy. 
The Trial Court did not properly find grounds within the 
meaning of the law (no evidence was offered) and denied us due 
process of law that provides for marriage preservation, all of 
which should void the decree. 
I respectfully ask the Appellate Court to reverse our divorce 
decree and remand to the District Court this case for dismissal. 
Dated the 14th day of July, 1997. 
Dan Rodney Joos, Pro Se 3? <#&& 
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